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1Research Paper no. 2/09
MULTIPLE EFFECTS OB BUSINESS PLANS ON NEW
VENTURES1
Abstract
We investigate the impact of writing a business plan prior to start-up on new venture
performance. Our analysis makes new contributions by examining multiple effects of
business plans. This approach allows the impacts of business plans to be disentangled
from selection effects due to differences in the profile and business context of
ventures that are more or less likely to write a business plan. We offer an empirical
methodology and apply it to UK data where we find that business plans promote
employment growth. This is found to be due to the impact of the plan and not
selection effects.
Keywords: New Ventures, Business Plans, Switching Regression Modelling
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referees which have helped to improve the paper and the contribution of John Cottrell in developing
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21. Introduction
Business plans are a prevalent feature of new venture management and are
encouraged by government agencies, education institutions and consultants. They are
frequently a core input to seeking loan and equity finance. There is also a widespread
belief that writing a business plan will impact favourably on the performance of a
venture. As a consequence, entrepreneurs may feel pressurised to signal their worth
by having a written business plan outlining their vision for future business expansion.
Honig (2008) and Honig and Karlsson (2004) argue that this widespread writing of
business plans by entrepreneurs has more to do with coercive and mimetic forces to
legitimise their business venture. Subsequently, these authors raise the valid question
of whether or not business plans really add any value to a new venture.
Bhide (2000) adds depth to the question by suggesting that the impact of business
plans on new venture performance is unlikely to be a generic positive, negative or
negligible effect. Instead, he argues that the efficacy of business plans are likely to be
governed by the context within which, business plans are written. Some are written to
raise loan finance with the purpose of reassuring lenders of the low risk and secure
positive cashflow position of the business; others are written to help a founding self
funded entrepreneur devise a market entry and growth strategy for a high risk
innovative new product in an emerging uncertain market. The effects on performance
are unlikely to be the same in such widely varying contexts.
The added complication is that the propensity of entrepreneurs to select to write a
business plan may itself be influenced by the profile of the new venture and its
business context. A venture which contains people with plenty of relevant experience
may feel that writing a business plan is a costly use of time. By contrast, an
entrepreneur that knows little about the market and with ‘lower’ entrepreneurial
capabilities may feel that the paper exercise of writing a business plan is both
informative and instructive. Equally, a venture with access to support and advice may
find it easier to write a business plan than those lacking support. It is, therefore, likely
that due to selection effects the profile and context of ventures with business plans
may vary systematically from those without plans. The issue here, in terms of
measuring the effect of business plans on performance, is that it is easy to confuse the
true effects of business plans with differences due to selection effects. In other words,
any empirical study which seeks to assess the impact of writing a business plan needs
to ensure that it does not confuse the impact of the business plan with selection effects
which cause the profile or context of a venture with a business plan to systematically
differ to one that does not have a plan.
Therefore, robust empirical proof that writing a business plan has an impact on the
performance of a new venture requires isolating the following elements:
(1) It should estimate, separate and account for the manner in which
the profile and contexts of ventures that select to write business
3plans might differ systematically from those that do not write a
plan. This is to ensure that differences due to selection are not
mistaken for the impact of writing a business plan. In short, it
should control for observable and unobservable differences
between those that write plans and those that do not.
(2) It should also account for the possibility that the impact of writing
business plans on new venture performance will itself depend on
the profile of the new venture (e.g., previously unemployed person)
and the context in which the plan was written (e.g., writing a
business plan in order to secure bank finance).
At present the modus operandi is to use discrete (1, 0) dummy variables (see, for
example, Reid and Smith, 2000; Vivarelli, 2004) to test the impact of a venture
having a written business plan. This approach typically entails using a single equation
estimation approach to simply capture a biased and inconsistent average effect of
business plans. It neither allows for the isolation of impact effects from selection
effects nor does it show how impact effects vary with the context in which the plan
was written (see, Appendix 1). The end result is an ambiguous interpretation of the
impact of business plans. For example, if plans are found to be efficacious, is this
really a true impact effect or could it be due to more ambitious ventures being more
likely to write a business plan (selection effect)? Alternatively, if business plans are
not found to improve venture performance, might this be a signal that writing a
business plan is a time consuming distraction from simply getting on with the
business (i.e. a zero or negative impact effect)? Does it, instead, indicate a selection
effect where more able entrepreneurs feel they don’t need to write a business plan (i.e.
a negative selection effect)? Or, yet further, is it the case that a positive impact effect
is being offset by a negative selection effect of equal magnitude? Overall, the impact
of business plans is likely to be clouded by venture profile and contextual differences
that are not accounted for in the average effect provided by the single equation
estimation approach.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the empirical literature points inconclusively to any
association between business plans and venture performance. Indeed, despite
considerable efforts (Robinson and Pearce, 1983; Robinson et al. 1986, Boyd, 1991,
Bhide, 2000), there has been little in the way of an agreed consensus, even amongst
studies that have examined established ventures as to the value of business plans (e.g.
Fredrickson, and Mitchell, 1984; Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989; Brews and Hunt,
1999). This also applies to new ventures. Studies such as those by Perry (2001),
Delmar and Shane (2003) and Liao and Gartner (2006) all point to a positive
relationship between business plans and survival whilst Gruber (2007) finds that plans
help achieve marketing objectives. Meanwhile, Tornikoski and Newbert (2007),
Haber and Reichel (2007) and Honig and Karlsson (2004) all struggle to find any
relationship between business plans and performance.
4The contribution of this paper is to develop an econometric methodology which is
able to estimate both selection and impact effects. To successfully achieve this, two
criteria need to be jointly satisfied. The first is that any model must allow for the
endogeneity of business plans in venture performance. For example, if it is the case
that more able entrepreneurs are more likely to write business plans (self-selection)
they are also likely to have better performance regardless of business plans. If
endogeneity is ignored, biased and inconsistent estimates of the impact of plans (due
to the conflation of plan effects with unobservable ability/motivation) are likely. A
traditional resolution of this problem is to use a Heckman selection model. However,
such models fail to allow for the interaction of business plans effects with
venture/entrepreneur profiles and the context for plans. Equally, whilst the use of a
moderating/mediating approach (see Baron and Kenny, 1986) satisfies the need for
interaction, it fails to deal with the issue of endogeneity.
Our approach is to use an endogenous switching regression model (see Maddala and
Nelson, 1975; Maddala, 1983) to control for both endogeneity and interaction effects.
In common with others, we define business plans as those activities conducted by a
venture founder to gather information to exploit a business opportunity, typically
documented in a written business plan (Delmar and Shane, 2003; Castrogiovanni,
1996). Our model provides a natural framework in which to analyze the multiple
effects of business plans because it identifies selection effects and shows how the
impact effects vary depending on the planner profile and the context for writing a
business plan (interaction effects). At the same time it deals with the issue of
endogeneity by controlling for selection bias caused by unobservable variables such
as the ability of the venture founder. We emphasize that whilst, within this
framework, ventures may still be characterized as either having or not having a
business plan at start-up this does not imply the effects of business plans are one
dimensional: impact effects in the endogenous switching regression are an explicit
function of venture profiles/contexts rather than a constant (in contrast to the dummy
variable approach: see Appendix 1).
The net result is that this approach allows for more insightful estimates on the effect
writing a business plan on new venture performance. We apply the model to UK data
on 622 de novo entrepreneurs in relation to one performance measure, namely growth
in the size of the venture as measured by employment size. The dataset allows us to
identify some contextual variables, such as whether the new venture is launching a
new product/service and whether it was trying to raise bank finance, and profile
variables such as whether the entrepreneur has run a business before (serial
entrepreneur) and whether she was previously unemployed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we explain
how theory relating to business plans requires an empirical methodology sufficient to
account for selection and impact dimensions of the relationship between business
plans and new venture performance. We then discuss the data set and follow this by a
5discussion of the methodology. The results are then presented next followed by
discussion and conclusions
2. Theory background and hypotheses development
In this section we outline various theories from management (with some relevant
contributions from finance and economics) which contribute to our understanding of
how writing business plans may affect or be related to new venture performance. The
central thrust of this paper is that the relationship between new venture performance
and writing business plans is comprised of a selection and an impact effect where both
of these vary depending on the profile and business context of the venture. It is these
interaction effects that are important in explaining the subsequent performance of the
venture.
We begin by looking at theories outlining how writing a business plan can make an
impact and then look at instances where there may be a correlation but without an
actual causation (i.e. cases where due to selection effects the profile or nature of
ventures with business plans systematically differ from those that do not engage in
this activity). Nearly all of the theories related to an impact effect are based around
how they affect the competencies and/or resource base of the firm. In this setting
writing business plans are seen as making existing resources more effective (e.g.
increasing judgemental ability of the senior management in relation to
entrepreneurship) or augmenting the resources used by the firm (e.g. raising new
finance and hence more optimally capitalizing the firm). We also outline some theory
which argues that business plans have a negative impact on the performance of new
ventures. These are based around notions that business plans can make management
less effective (e.g. promote an over reliance on planning in uncertain environments
that may be less suitable for planning) and can be an excessively time consuming
(costly) activity which draws entrepreneurs away from doing more productive
activities (for example, like pilot a product launch in order to gauge the existence and
extent of a perceived market gap). Throughout all of the above discussion we also
highlight theory indicating that the efficacy of business plans is likely to be affected
by the context in which they are written.
With this background we then move on to discuss theory relating to selection effects
which may give the illusion of business plans making an impact when in fact the
observed difference in performance is simply due to differences in the profile/context
of those more and less likely to write business plans.
Impact Effects I: enhancing or retarding the efficacy of existing resources?
If entrepreneurial performance is driven by the ability of new ventures to successfully
exploit new profit opportunities, then entrepreneurial performance is itself driven by
two core dimensions (Casson, 1982, Schultz 1975, Audretsch et al., 2001, Shane,
62003). Firstly, it is about entrepreneurial acumen or capability - the ability to
perceive a profit opportunity (Kirzner, 1973) as well as devise a means (including a
strategy) to exploit it (Sharma and Erramili, 2004). This requires robust market
information about the existence of a market gap, creative talent to make the leap to
generate an idea for a service/product to satisfy the unmet consumer desire and a
vision/strategy for a new venture to enter, grow and prosper in this market. Secondly,
entrepreneurial performance depends on the ability to acquire resources so that a new
venture has the capability to deliver the strategy. This typically requires resources
such as technology, market/industry expertise, credibility (with suppliers and
customers), consumer awareness (marketing and promotion), sufficiently skilled and
motivated team of people, premises and finances. We adopt this taxonomy in order to
discuss theories outlining means through which writing a business plan can impact the
performance of a venture. We first discuss its effect on entrepreneurial capability to
identify a business opportunity and devising a means to exploit it. We then move on
to discuss business plans as a document used to attract resources e.g. finance, sweat
equity, non executive directors and so on.
Bygrave and Zacharakis (2004) and Timmons (1999) have argued that the
development of an entrepreneurial idea alongside a sound execution plan are the key
means through which writing a business plan can enhance the performance of a new
venture. They point out that most business plans are boundary spanning activities that
an author adopts to employ analysis/techniques from, inter alia, strategy, marketing,
economics, operations, human resources and accounting and finance. A central
benefit, therefore, is that the discipline of engaging with these areas of management is
likely to result in a better thought out, prepared and realistic market entry and growth
strategy. Delmar and Shane (2003) go one step further and argue that through this
same exercise business plans may stimulate faster and better decision making speeds
because they allow entrepreneurs to test their assumptions before expending valuable
resources. In essence, they claim that having a business plan enhances a venture’s
performance.
The ensuing debate in the strategic management literature between planning and
emergent strategies outlines various means through which writing a business plan can
impact the performance of the venture. Proponents of business plans argue that
entrepreneurial contexts make business plans valuable undertakings (Castrogiovanni,
1996). One reason for this is the belief that business plans are likely to promote more
efficient managerial decision making such as managing supply and demand and, by
doing so, reducing bottlenecks (Delmar and Shane, 2003). In the same vein the need
to ‘write’ a business plan is often seen as a discipline which encourages entrepreneurs
to more rigorously think through (elaborate and stress test) their business strategy and
subject it to market research (Gruber, 2007) i.e. a reality test.
By contrast, Bhide (2000) argues that there are often more efficient uses of
entrepreneurs’ time than writing a business plan. He argues that particularly in new
markets for novel products/services it is not possible to gauge customer demand
7unless one actually tries to sell to them. Bhide (2000) argues that in these
circumstances business plans are a poor means of reducing uncertainty. Instead, he
claims that more accurate information can be secured by undertaking a pilot launch
where the venture tests out the appeal of the product service by attempting to sell it to
a small segment or share of the market. If entrepreneurs have limited time at their
disposal so that writing a business plan detracts from time spent piloting the
product/service then in this situation Bhide (2000) believes that it can reduce the
performance of the venture; as it means that managerial decision making will be
based on less accurate information.
However, the research literature indicates that whether business plans have a positive
or negative impact is in fact likely to depend on the specific context in which they are
being used. This is a point not only acknowledged but in fact emphasised by Bhide
(2000) who argues that business plans are likely to have a positive impact in more
static and predictable/stable markets or in cases where entrepreneurs are undertaking
more imitative ventures. By contrast, he argues that in highly uncertain markets
where entrepreneurs are introducing highly innovative products/services business
plans may not be able reduce this uncertainty and hence be a waste of time. This view
is contested by Matthews and Scott (1995) and Zollo and Winter (2002) who while
conceding that business plans will be less accurate in predicting market opportunities
in situations of uncertainty argue that they can in fact highlight the degree of
uncertainty present in the markets and hence prime entrepreneurs to think and respond
more effectively (so, for example, being deliberately more flexible - keeping the
venture agile and having an innovative strategic mindset in preparedness of what the
unknown may throw at the firm) than what would otherwise have been the case.
Hence, these authors argue that, whilst entrepreneurs typically ‘fight fires’ with few
resources to spare, those entrepreneurs that write business plans have not only the
‘substantive’ capability to solve problems (Winter, 2003), they also have better
“…dynamic ability to change or reconfigure existing substantive capabilities …”
(Zahra et al. 2006: 921).
This discussion highlights the importance of contexts and venture profiles which will
influence the amount of information available to an entrepreneur and how a business
plan might help reduce this. So for example, if one assumes that a person who is
previously unemployed is less informed about markets and industry
practices/techniques then it may be the case that the information enhancing impact of
writing a business plan may be more beneficial to this type of person. Likewise, a
similar logic may apply to a serial versus a novice entrepreneur – the latter probably
generating more benefit from writing a business plan than the former. Similarly, a
portfolio entrepreneur facing the challenge of juggling the complexity of the
simultaneous involvement in different ventures may feel that the presence of written
business plan assists their focus and information when shifting their input from one
venture to the next. So there are good reasons to believe that the impact of business
plans on venture performance may not be uniform when viewed across different types
of ventures and entrepreneurs. Likewise, a venture that is launching a new product or
8service to market faces different challenges to one which is more imitative and so one
might not expect to find the impact of business plans on venture performance to be
identical in both circumstances. For these reasons we will later test whether
contextual factors such as these play a role in influencing the scale and sign (positive
versus negative) of the impact of business plans on venture performance – in the case
of this paper on one performance dimension: new venture growth in employment.
Impact Effects II: increasing the level of resources available to the venture
Another school of thought regarding the impact of business plans on venture
performance is that they act as a marketing or communications document in order to
‘sell’ or explain the firm’s vision and strategy to financiers (investors and banks) and
those considering offering sweat equity (e.g. employees willing to work for reduced
or no wages in return for equity and non executive directors). In this case the
business plan does not need to enhance vision, strategy or execution plan of the
venture in order to enhance its performance, it merely ensures that a venture is better
resourced (not or less undercapitalized) so that it can effectively enter a market and
grow at its ideal rate2.
This insight acts as a counter to some authors who claim that writing a business plan
delays the movement from thinking about an idea and putting it into action. Carter et
l. (1996) argue that improvisation is the key: entrepreneurs are better served if they
concentrate on acquiring and mobilizing resources such as buying equipment or hiring
people. In essence, this incremental approach favours the accretion and employment
of tacit (non-theoretical) knowledge and, by implication, has a ‘bias for action’
(McGrath, 1995). However, authors such as Storey (1994) and Evans and Jovanovic
(1989), Burke et al (2000), Haber and Reichel, (2007) have argued that a lack of
resources (particularly finance) is one of the main obstacles to firm start-up and
growth. At the heart of this resource constrained view is the problem of asymmetric
information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Cressy, 1996) where resource providers such
as investors know less about the business than the entrepreneur and hence face higher
uncertainty (plus associated problems of adverse selection and moral hazard). In the
area of bank finance, venture capital and to a lesser degree business angel finance,
2 One main purpose of business plans is to solve a problem of a lack of information for third parties.
This is most likely to involve banks since they form the main source of external financial support to
new ventures. Data from the UK Survey of SME Finances (UKSMEF: see Fraser, 2005) indicates that,
whilst non-market finance (owner’s savings) was used by almost 70% of start-ups, the main external
source of finance was bank loans (20%) with less than 1% using venture capital. US data again
suggests the owner was the main source of finance for new ventures (aged less than 2 years) in the
form of equity (20%) or debt (6%) (see Berger and Udell, 1998). However, as in the UK, the main
external source of finance is bank loans (16%) with only a very small percentage using venture capital
(Berger and Udell, 1998). Without a track record or good information on the profit opportunity, banks
often find it difficult to evaluate the likely risk/reward profile. Hence, business plans act as an
information provider and screening device for these resource providers so that they will be more able to
assess the risk of financing a venture (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).
9business plans have become a major means through which these financiers seek to
become better informed in order to be able to make a commercially valid assessment
of the risk /reward profile of any particular venture. In this case business plans
provide a screening function for financiers – in order to better enable them to assess
the risk of providing resources (e.g. loans, equity, sweat equity, or supplier credit) to
the venture.
What is also interesting about this practice is that regardless of whether business plans
actually enable financiers to better screen ventures, if they are deemed to be an
important component of an application for finance, then a venture with a business
plan is likely to be better resourced than one without. This observation is an
important antidote to the criticism of business plans as generating no value added
except to legitimise the venture. Both Stinchcombe (1965) and Aldrich and Fiol
(1994) argue that central to the development of a new venture is the need to legitimate
it in the eyes of outside agents, not only to acquire resources but also simply to
overcome any liability of newness. Macmillan and Narasimha (1987) argue that these
pressures to legitimate mean that investors tend to use business plans as vehicles for
testing the credibility of the new venture. Likewise, Tornikoski and Newbert (2007)
argue that business plans are deployed symbolically (Castrogiovanni, 1996) to
influence the perceptions of external audiences. Two particular strands of theory
stand out here. First, the institutional theoretic approach implies that business plans
might be seen as a device to make the new venture seem more predictable (Hannan
and Freeman, 1984; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). This approach, therefore, argues that
new ventures face pressures to conform and homogenize with existing institutional
forms: to ‘act as if’ they are similar to other organizations in their urge to gain
resources (Tornikoski and Newbert, 2007). Honig and Karlsson (2004) have also
argued that the expectation amongst outside agents is that new ventures ought to have
a business plan because of an isomorphic imperative to mimic other organizations.
Therefore, to sum up the discussion so far, we have outlined a set of views that have
identified two means through which business plans have potential to make a positive
impact on venture performance, namely enhancing the amount of resources at the
firm’s disposal (particularly financial resources) and also improving the venture’s
entrepreneurial capability (vision, strategy, and method of implementation).
Regarding the latter channel, we have also outlined a set of literature which argues
that business planning may in fact worsen vision, strategy and method of execution by
diverting time away from more productive endeavours. We have also indicated how
these effects are likely to be affected by the context in which a business plan is being
written.
We now move on to discuss the need to deal with potential for a spurious correlation
between writing a business plan and new venture performance which could be due to
a selection effect – namely, where the pre plan capability, ambition, context and hence
performance of firms with a propensity to write business plans may systematically
differ from those with a lesser inclination.
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Selection effect: The relationship between venture type/nature and the
correlation between writing a business plan and new venture performance:
Bhide (2000) highlights the causes of profile differences between entrepreneurs who
have a higher versus lower propensity to write business plans. He notes that it is
difficult to gauge which group are likely to have the more able/productive
entrepreneurial profile. On the one hand, more able entrepreneurs may feel that
writing a business plan is a poor use of time since they can effectively convince
investors (who frequently claim to invest in people over ideas) and banks to finance
their business without a business plan. Likewise, they may be able to devise an
effective vision, strategy and method of implementation for their venture without
having to write it up as a business plan. If this was the only consideration then one
would expect the profile of ventures without a business plan to be more promising
from a performance point of view.
But Bhide (2000) also points out that it might easily be the other way around as more
ambitious and complex ventures with rapid growth potential may benefit from a
written plan at start up. Similarly, higher ability entrepreneurs may find the strategic,
economic, marketing, operations, human resource management, SME management,
accounting and finance managerial analysis/research in business plans easier to do
and hence the time they require (and external support needed) to write a business plan
is less than that of less talented/skilled entrepreneurs. Both of these factors could give
rise to a situation where the profile of ventures with a business plan has higher growth
potential then those without.
It may also be the case that screening by resource providers will affect the profile of
the types of businesses who make use of this common form of external funding.
Given that banks prefer low risk ventures, they screen ventures in order to distinguish
between high and low risk borrowers so that the profile of ventures who borrow from
banks is likely to be of lower risk (Parker, 2003). If business plans are an effective
means of enabling banks to screen ventures in order to select less risky borrowers,
then it is possible that among new ventures who borrow from banks, that those who
write business plans differ in their performance from those who do not simply
because their profile is different.
Likewise, we know that entrepreneurs with higher levels of wealth are less likely to
face liquidity constraints (e.g. Evans and Jovanovic, 1989, Burke et al. 2000). Burke
and Hanley (2003, 2006) also show that their propensity to take risks is likely to be
affected by the level of their wealth and that banks appear to alter interest rate
margins in response to these variations in wealth and hence risk profile. Since
business plans are frequently used to attract resources at start-up higher wealth
individuals might be less likely to select to write a business plan since they are less
likely to require external finance. As a result another selection effect emerges where
the risk taking propensity of ventures with business plans may systematically differ
from those without.
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Therefore, in order to estimate the impact of business plans on new venture
performance one must make sure that selection effects such as these do not get mixed
up and mistaken for an impact effect. Furthermore, we note that as was also the case
with impact effects, that the literature indicates that the scale and direction (positive or
negative) of these selection effects may also vary depending on the context and
profiles of ventures choosing or refraining from writing a business plan. Our
econometric methodology ensures that this level of discrimination can be
estimated/reported and notably accounts for the effect of unobservable profiles. This
leads us to our core questions and hence testable hypotheses. In the first hypothesis
we test whether the theory purporting a positive impact of writing a business plan on
new venture performance is supported by the evidence.
Hypothesis 1: Controlling for selection effects, a written business plan has a
positive effect on new venture performance.
We noted above a number of theories which indicated that the differences in the
profiles of ventures and context in which business plans are written can influence the
scale and direction of both selection and impact of effects. These are important
factors governing the multiple impact of business planning on new venture
performance. For example, in terms of context, one might expect the emphasis of a
business plan written to convince a banker that the venture is low risk may have a
different impact than one written to flesh out a high growth/risk strategy for market
entry by an innovative venture in a new emerging industry. It is also the case that any
selection effect is unlikely to be uniform across both of these contexts as the profile of
ventures who select to write a business plan in order to raise bank finance (from risk
averse lenders) is likely to be somewhat different to the profile of ventures writing
business plans in order to devise a strategy for an innovative and highly risky venture
in a new industry. Venture/entrepreneur profile differences also affect selection and
impact effects. As we observed above aspects such as previously being unemployed,
as well as being a novice, serial and portfolio entrepreneur are all likely to have a
bearing on the magnitude and direction of impact and selection effects. This leads to
our second and final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The scale and direction (positive or negative) of the selection
and impact effects of writing a business plan on new venture performance are
likely to be affected by the profile of the venture and the context in which
business plans are written.
We summarise our discussion of the theory and hypotheses by illustration with
reference to Figure 1. We start at the left of the figure and show that ventures select
between writing or not writing business plans based on their profile and business
context. The top arrow represents ventures who have selected to write business plans
while the bottom those who have not. Each translates into a total effect on
performance which is comprised of both the real impact of writing a business plan and
the selection effect due to the fact that there will be some systematic differences
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between the profile and contexts of ventures with written business plans compared to
those without written business plans.
[Figure 1 about here]
So, for example, a previously unemployed person may be more likely to write a
business plan than a person who was in employment. If the average ability of
somebody who was previously unemployed is less than that of a person who is
employed then this could give rise to a negative selection effect where non business
planners will grow faster than business planners. However, if business plans also
have a positive impact effect on venture growth (Hypothesis 1) and if this is a bigger
effect than the selection effect then the total performance effect (TPE) will be
positive. But selection and impact effects are unlikely to be uniform across different
venture profiles and contexts (Hypothesis 2). So, for example, it may also be the case
that ventures which are trying to raise bank finance may be more likely to write
business plans than those that are not. However, in this case the selection effect is
likely to be different to that of the above example of the previously unemployed
person: all other things being equal the profiles of ventures trying to raise bank
finance might be quite different to those of a previously unemployed person e.g. those
trying to raise bank finance might be in less risky business contexts and have higher
ability profiles (suitable to secure bank loans) than a previously unemployed person.
Likewise impact effects across different profiles and contexts would not be expected
to be uniform. As we saw above a business plan written to obtain a bank loan has
more to do with securing greater resources (impact effect II); whereas a business plan
written by a previously unemployed person may be more aimed at enhancing their
ability to devise a strategy to manage the launch and growth of their new venture
(impact effect I). Our empirical approach is able to isolate and account for these
varying effects in exactly this manner (see Appendix 1).
3. Methodology
3.1 Sample and design
There were two principal purposes underlying the construction and design of our
study. First, we were interested in identifying de novo ventures rather than those that
appeared to be ‘new’. This is a common problem given the paucity of information
about new ventures (Dess and Robinson, 1984; Sapienza, Smith, and Gannon, 1988)
due to their novelty, or the biased/unreliable (Birley, Muzyka, Dove, and Russel,
1995) nature of datasets. To resolve this common problem, and specifically focus
upon de novo ventures, we sourced the sample from publicly available county
telephone lists for the year 2000 (see Figure 2). This has the advantage of being more
likely to capture new ventures missed in official statistics but is also likely to biased
to include ventures that were not, in fact, de novo.
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Hence, to identify de novo ventures, we began by collecting British Telecom ‘White
pages’ for the year 20003. We then compared these lists with venture lists – again
derived from the same data source and for the identical geographic areas - for the year
1995. We then cross-checked 2000 venture entries with that of 1995 entries to see if
they had appeared in the 2000 but not in the 1995 telephone directory. If so, we
provisionally identified them as new ventures.
Following on from this initial screening exercise, we then telephoned the
entrepreneurs of these prospective ‘new’ ventures to establish that they met our
specified criteria for a new venture: that they were new ventures, independent of
outside control (not subsidiaries or part of larger enterprises), indigenous to the local
area, non-retail, still in operation, and were not a charity or other not-for-profit
organization. From this process, the total population of wholly new ventures was
identified. We then re-telephoned every third venture to arrange face-to-face
interviews with the venture founders given that very many new ventures were likely
also to be small: indeed, more than a third of our sample had no employees.
Respondents answered a structured interview questionnaire, which was subjected to a
pre-test in order to check for biased, misleading or confusing questions. Prior to the
questionnaire being administered, we again checked that the ventures met our criteria.
The structured interview was administered at the normal place of work of the
entrepreneur and took about an hour to complete.
[Figure 2 about here]
Our second focus was to ensure that our results could be generalised. Like other
countries, England has wide regional disparities in its start up rates (VAT
registrations). These differences are pronounced. In the South East of England
(London and South East regions), start up rates are around 55 VAT registrations per
10,000 of the adult population. In the Midlands (West and East Midlands regions) the
start up rate is around 35 whilst in the North East of England VAT registrations are
around 20. These regional disparities are long standing (Storey, 1982). To reflect
these differences, our study focused on three specimen English counties with differing
entrepreneurial outcomes. The first of these was Cleveland which has remained a low
entrepreneurship area (measured by official statistics on the rate of start-ups) for more
than 30 years. Building upon prior research which shows this (e.g. Storey, 1982;
Storey and Strange, 1993), we wished to contrast this county with counties with either
average entrepreneurship outcomes (Shropshire) or with counties with high rates of
start up activity (Buckinghamshire)4. Interviews with entrepreneurs in each of these
3 Whilst the British Telecom White pages directories are not a census of business activity, they do have
the advantages of being common (typically called the ‘phone book’ in the UK).
4 A recent study by Burke, FitzRoy and Nolan (2008) find evidence that regions in the North of
England with lower self-employment rates than the South of England perform better (create more jobs)
than their southern counterparts. Again, indicating the importance of accounting for regional effects
associated with varying start-up rates on employee growth among new ventures.
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three counties took place in 2001 and attracted a response rate ranging from 45% in
Cleveland to 75% in Shropshire (see Greene, Mole and Storey, 2004).
3.2 Econometric model
The empirical analysis uses a regression model with endogenous switching (Maddala
and Nelson, 1975). In analytical terms, the model is a simultaneous system of
equations that explicitly accounts for the decision to write a business plan and the
correlation between the error terms (i.e., unobservable profiles) in the plans decision
and performance equations. In this manner, the model yields an estimate of the total
plans effect (see Figure 1) which is free from selection bias. This means that the total
plans effect is unbiased by systematic variations in unobservable profiles, such as
entrepreneurial capability and motivation, between planners and non-planners5. This
total effect can then be decomposed into its constituent selection and impact effects
for the purposes of testing the hypotheses (see Appendix 1 for an explanation of the
maximum likelihood techniques used to estimate the model and derivation of the total
plans, impact and selection effects).
3.3 Dependent variables
Performance is estimated simultaneously with a selection equation for the decision to
write a business plan (to control for selection bias/differences in unobservable
profiles) in the endogenous switching regression model described previously.
Accordingly there are two dependent variables – the performance measure (growth)
and a binary variable for whether or not the venture had a business plan prior to start-
up (this latter variable is derived from a question which asks: ‘prior to the business
starting, did you have a formal written business plan?’ (yes=1, no=0)).
Growth effects are estimated by regressing the natural log of employment in 2001 on
the natural log of initial size and the other explanatory variables6. The derivation of
the effects of plans on employment growth is described in detail in Appendix 1. We
chose employment as a performance measure for two reasons. First, employment is
an indicator of the likely resources available to the venture (e.g. Hanks, Watson,
5 Selection bias in estimates of the total plan effects would be caused by non-random unobserved
differences, between planners and non-planners, which are correlated with performances. For example,
(unobserved) entrepreneurial capability may affect both plans decisions and performances: failure to
take this correlation into account will result in an estimate of the total plans effect which incorporates a
spurious contribution from entrepreneurial capability. The simultaneous equation model deals with this
problem by explicitly allowing for correlation between the unobservables (error terms) in the equations
for plans decisions and performances. Indeed, the dummy variable approach can also be corrected for
selection bias through the use of a Heckman selection model but, unlike the endogenous switching
regression model, not for interaction effects as well.
6 The number of employees includes the founder. This avoids problems with attempting to take the log
of zero (i.e., minus infinity) in the log size model which would lead to a large number of observations
(164) being dropped from the model. Nonetheless, this expedient does not affect the measurement of
growth since clearly the founder is counted in both the initial and current size.
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Jansen, and Chandler, 1993; Box, Watts, and Hisrich, 1994; Bruderl and
Preisendorfer, 2000; Bruton and Rubanik, 2002). Second, employment is generally
recognized as being less commercially sensitive than other measures such as sales
(Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, and Woo, 1994).
3.4 Explanatory variables
Our model, as summarized in Figure 1, indicates that decisions to write business
plans, and subsequent performance, depend on venture/entrepreneur profiles and the
context for writing business plans. In this regard, the theory section has highlighted a
number of specific factors. In this section, we set out in full the particular variables in
our data-set that we include in profiles (i.e., internal factors) and contexts (i.e.,
external factors), and their expected relationship with decisions to write business
plans and performance.
Venture profiles: The dominant element of these profiles relates to entrepreneurial
capability. At the outset, we recognise that capability is largely an unobservable
profile: indeed, a key feature of the model is that it is designed to control for selection
on unobservable profiles. However, our data-set includes some variables which are
related to capability and, more generally, to the human capital of the entrepreneur.
One of these variables is whether the entrepreneur is a novice, serial, or portfolio
entrepreneur (Westhead and Wright, 1998). We measure serial entrepreneurship by
asking respondents: ‘Had you been in business before as an owner?’ (yes=1, no=0)
and portfolio entrepreneurship by asking: ‘Is the Founder currently a Director or
Owner of any business other than this one?’ (yes=1, no=0).
We expect that serial entrepreneurs may derive less benefit from business plans since
they are able to draw from their previous experience. Conversely, a portfolio
entrepreneur may feel that the presence of a written business plan is beneficial when
shifting their input from one venture to the next. We would also expect that, to the
extent that serial/portfolio entrepreneurs are more capable than novices, that both of
these variables are positively related to venture performance.
Another more general measure of the human capital of the entrepreneur is previous
unemployment (‘Were you unemployed immediately prior to establishing this
business?’; yes=1, no=0) which, in keeping with Honig and Karlsson (2004) and
Vivarelli (2004), is as an indicator of low human capital. Also, education is measured
with a dummy variable for education to degree level: degree: yes=1, no=0 (Burke,
FitzRoy, and Nolan, 2000). The arguments, put forward in the theory section, point to
the greater benefits of writing business plans for entrepreneurs with low human
capital (implying a positive (resp. negative) relationship between previous
unemployment (resp. education) and decisions to write business plans). We also
anticipate, following on from Cressy (1996), that the effects of human capital on
venture performance are likely to be unambiguously positive.
16
We also included gender in the model. Cooper et al. (1994) suggest that males are
more likely to start growth orientated ventures, indicating a positive relationship with
growth. However, we have no prior expectation about the relationship (if any)
between gender and the writing of business plans.
Two measures which are related specifically to the costs of writing business plans are
whether the firm kept financial records electronically (e-records: yes=1; no=0) and if
there was a bookkeeper/accountant (own accountant: yes=1; no=0). Therefore, these
variables are included in the business plans equation but excluded a priori from the
performance equation because we expect that such factors reduce the costs (and
increase the likelihood) of writing business plans but have no direct effect on
performance. In technical terms these exclusions help to identify the effects of
business plans on performance (see Appendix 1).
In addition we control for sectors through a series of dummies (construction,
distribution, manufacturing, non retail/professional services). These dummies capture
variations in labour and capital intensity which may affect decisions to write business
plans through the need to attract resources. Sectors may also have a role in measuring
contexts of varying market uncertainty (see below). However, in this regard, we
acknowledge that our available measures of sector lack sufficient granularity to
capture variations in market uncertainty fully. We also control for the legal form of
the venture (limited company, partnership and sole proprietorship).
Contexts: An important context for writing a business plan is because the
entrepreneur has external capital demands (which, empirically, are principally in the
form of demands for bank finance). We therefore proxy external capital demands
with the use of bank finance at start-up, expecting the use of bank finance/external
capital demands to increase the likelihood of the venture writing a business plan.
However, the use of bank finance at start up is clearly endogenous since business
plans increase the likelihood of receiving bank finance. Accordingly we instrument
this variable with the use of bank finance in the year before the survey (i.e., in 2000-
2001); in fact, we find that this measure is highly correlated with the use of bank
finance at start-up (see Table 1) but is uncorrelated with the error term in the business
plans equation (suggesting the instrument is valid – see below for a more detailed
discussion). The use of bank finance is also included in the performance equations
since firms with access to capital are less likely to be undercapitalized and hence more
likely to grow faster than those without such access.
We also examine contexts where the venture introduced new products and services.
Regarding plans decisions, on the one hand the introduction of new products/services
may be associated with greater market uncertainty which cannot be reduced by
business plans (suggesting a negative relationship). On the other hand, plans may
increase the agility of the venture in these contexts and so be beneficial (suggesting a
positive relationship). The introduction of new products/services would also be
expected to improve venture performance (see Freel and Robson, 2004).
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Another important context is where the venture used external support at start-up.
Chrisman and McMullen (2000) provide evidence that external support is a key asset
so we measure this by asking respondents if they have used any external support prior
to commencing their venture (yes=1, no=0). We would expect the use of external
support to reduce the costs of writing business plans and hence increase the likelihood
that the venture has a business plan. External support may also help to improve
venture performance (Mole et al. 2008).
An important context in our data-set is the area in which the venture is located.
Earlier on, we drew attention to the regional differences in start up rates in England.
Our study examines three specimen regions using dummies: a ‘high’ entrepreneurship
area (Buckinghamshire); an ‘average’ area (Shropshire); and a ‘low’ enterprise area
(Cleveland). Although there is no specific research that has looked at how business
plans are used at a regional level, our anticipation is that the isomorphic pressures to
homogenize and legitimate the venture by using a business plan will be regionally
invariant. However, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that venture performance is
influenced by geographic location (Reynolds et al. 1994; Acs and Armington, 2004)
so we would expect stronger employment growth in regions with higher start up rates.
We also control for the macroeconomic context at venture creation through vintage
(age) dummies.
In summary, the explanatory variables used in the models, following from the theory,
relate to venture profiles and contexts for writing business plans. We have also set-
out our expectations regarding the relationships between these variables, on the one
hand, and decisions to write business plans and subsequent performance on the other.
On a priori grounds the variables e-records and own accountant, relating to the costs
of writing business plans, are included in the business plans equations but excluded
from the performance equations for the purpose of identification.
Regarding estimation, starting with a general model, which included all the
aforementioned variables in the business plans and performance equations (with the
exception of the variables excluded from the performance equation for the purpose of
identification) we tested down to derive a parsimonious model which is reported in
Table 2 in the next section7. The testing down approach involved dropping variables
from the general equations which were insignificant at the 10% level (p>0.10). The
key benefit of parsimony in this context is that dropping irrelevant variables increases
the precision/statistical significance of the estimated effects of the remaining variables
and of the resulting plans effects.
7 This is known in econometrics as the ‘general to specific’ methodology or the Hendry/LSE approach
(see e.g., Gilbert, 1986).
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4. Results
The results section is organized in the following manner. We begin by providing
summary statistics and simple bivariate correlations of the variables (Table 1). Then,
in Table 2, estimates of the determinants of decisions to write business plans, and
subsequent performance (log size in 2001 conditional on log initial size/growth), are
presented. Finally, in Table 3, the estimates of the total plans effect (TPE) on
employment growth and decompositions of the TPE into selection and impact effects,
are reported for the average venture profile/contexts and for specific profiles/contexts.
The results in Table 3 are therefore central to the testing of our two hypotheses.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 shows that 56% of the entrepreneurs wrote a formal business plan prior to
starting their venture; that the average log size at start-up was 0.75 (with an average
start-up size of 2.88 employees); that the average log size in 2001 was 1.27 (with an
average size in 2001 of 6.07 employees); and that some 29% experienced financial
problems in the first year. Table 1 also shows the bivariate correlations. The decision
to write a business plan is uncorrelated (at the 5% level) with the other dependent
variable. There is an expected high correlation (0.65) between log initial and current
size/size in 2001. In terms of the explanatory variables, where significant, none of the
correlations are above 0.25 indicating that, in relation to the econometric models,
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem.
In Table 2 there are three columns. The first of these columns traces the marginal
effects of a particular explanatory variable (e.g. prior entrepreneurial experience) on
the likelihood of writing a business plan. The second (with plan) and third (without
plan) columns, subsequently trace the determinants of performance in the presence
and absence of written business plans.
The first column of Table 2 shows that ventures with electronic financial records (e-
records) and new ventures with their own accountant are more likely to have written
business plans (by 9.6% points and 8.7% points respectively). This suggests that
being able to use financial spreadsheets and having access to internal financial advice
may make it easier/less costly for entrepreneurs to write business plans. Also,
previously unemployed entrepreneurs are more likely to write business plans, by
11.1% points, compared to those who were not unemployed. This is indicative of an
inverse relationship between human capital and the likelihood of having a business
plan. Access to external support at start-up appears to strongly reduce the costs of
writing business plans; the likelihood of having written business plans is 37.5% points
higher for ventures which used external support at start-up, Similarly, the positive
effect (13.6% points) for those ventures that bring new products to market points to
the greater benefits from having written business plans derived by those ventures
(suggesting that plans may help to increase venture agility in more
uncertain/innovative environments). Finally ventures located in Cleveland, an area of
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low entrepreneurship, are 23.4% points more likely to have written business plans
than those located in either Shropshire or Buckinghamshire.
[Table 2 about here]
Looking at other key results in Table 2, the main determinant of size in 2001
(columns 2 and 3) is initial size. A 1% increase in start-up size is associated with a
0.86% larger size in 2001, in the presence of a business plan, but the corresponding
effect, in the absence of a business plan, is only 0.63%. This means that two similar
ventures with the same number of employees at start-up (but one with a business plan
and the other without) will diverge in scale after start-up: in particular, the venture
with the business plan will grow faster.
Other important factors include the large negative effect of contact with a support
agency at start-up on current size, controlling for initial size, in the absence of
business plans (see column 3). This suggests that, amongst ventures which used
external support at start-up, those with business plans grew faster than those without
business plans. Another significant effect comes from bringing a new product/service
to market which is associated with a 34% larger size in 2001 (controlling for initial
size) when accompanied with a business plan. Interestingly, there is no corresponding
effect in the absence of a business plan. Again, this points to higher growth amongst
the ventures which wrote business plans (and suggests again the benefits of written
plans for more innovative new ventures).
Table 3 reports the TPE on employment growth and decompositions of the TPE into
impact and selection effects. These decompositions are reported for both the average
entrepreneur/venture profile (as summarized in Table 1) and for specific profiles and
business contexts (e.g., where the founder was previously unemployed and where
bank finance was used at start-up).
[Table 3 about here]
The results in the first row of Table 3 show that, for the average venture profile,
business plans are associated with higher annual average growth (TPE=23.4% points).
The decomposition of this TPE into a selection and impact effect reveals the impact
effect of business plans on growth is 33.4% points which provides strong support for
Hypothesis 1 (i.e., written business plans have a positive impact effect on new venture
growth). Interestingly, the corresponding selection effect, at -10% points, suggests
that ventures with business plans have lower growth profiles than those without plans.
This is consistent with less able entrepreneurs choosing to write business plans.
However, the positive impact effect outweighs the negative selection effect (which is
also true for all the other cases reported in Table 3) suggesting that business plans
may help less able entrepreneurs to catch up and surpass their abler counterparts
without plans.
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The remainder of Table 3 shows impact and profile effects vary depending on the
venture profile/context for writing business plans: impact effects range from 42%
points for portfolio entrepreneurs to 21.6% points for users of bank finance; selection
effects vary from -10% points for male and portfolio entrepreneurs and for ventures in
manufacturing, construction and professional sectors, to -7.3% points for users of
external support at start-up. Overall, these results support the contention set out in
Hypothesis 2 that impact and selection effects vary depending on the context in which
business plans were written.
Looking at some interesting specific instances, users of bank finance at start-up with
plans have lower growth profiles than those without plans (selection effect=-9.7%
points). This is consistent with banks choosing (with the aid of information in
business plans) to lend to lower risk/lower growth profile ventures. Nonetheless plans
have a positive impact effect (21.6% points) for this group suggesting that plans may
also be beneficial for users of bank finance. It is also notable that, amongst
previously unemployed entrepreneurs, despite those with plans having lower growth
profiles (selection effect=-9.7% points) the growth benefits from having business
plans are large and positive (impact effect=36.0% points). This would seem to
suggest the benefits of encouraging/assisting disadvantaged entrepreneurs with
writing business plans; a view which finds further support in the large and positive
impact effect (34.1% points) for users of external support at start-up8.
5. Discussion
The central aim of this paper was to re-examine the relationships between business
plans and new venture performance. We argued that this is an important endeavour
because prior approaches fail to fully capture the multiple effects of business plans.
8 We also report a couple of robustness checks on the results. Firstly we checked the validity of the
start-up bank finance instrument in the plans equation (i.e., use of bank finance in 2000-2001) by
testing it for correlation with the disturbance term in the plans equation: for the instrument to be valid
it should be uncorrelated with this disturbance term. This check was achieved by estimating a bivariate
probit model for the bank finance instrument and business plans decisions and testing the correlation
coefficient of the disturbances (  ). The test of 0 had a p-value of 0.75 so we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the correlation between the instrument and plans disturbance is zero. It is also possible
that the results may be biased by the potential endogeneity of other explanatory variables in the model.
Of particular concern here are the variables ‘Used External Support at Start-up’ and ‘New
Products/Services’ (suspicions being raised not least, because they are both highly significant in the
plans equation). We therefore re-estimated the models excluding ‘Used External Support at Start-up’
and ‘New Products/Services’ respectively and examined the impact this had on the estimated plans
effects. Excluding ‘Used External Support at Start-up’ yielded estimates of 24.7% points, -7.3% points
and 31.9% points for the TPE, Selection and Impact effects respectively; excluding ‘New
Products/Services’ yielded corresponding estimates of 24.6% points, -9.8% points and 34.4% points
respectively. Recalling that the original TPE, Selection and Impact effects, reported in Table 3, are
23.4% points, -10.0% points and 33.4% points respectively, it would seem that the results are robust to
potential endogeneity from other explanatory variables.
21
Our contribution was to develop and test a model that controlled for business plan
choice (selection effects) and highlighted that the impact of business plans on new
venture performance is also affected by the profile of the venture and the contexts in
which business plans are written. This is important because prior approaches do not
jointly control for these endogeneity and interaction effects. Endogeneity (selection)
is obviously important to control for because it reflects the choice of whether to write
a business plan. This, in turn, is important because of the on-going theoretical debate
about the value of business plans to the performance of new ventures. There are two
sides to this debate. On one side, are those that argue that deliberative business plans
lead to positive impacts on venture performance. On the other side are proponents
who argue that following an improvisational strategy leads to positive performance
outcomes.
One illustration of this debate is the influential paper by Sarasvathy (2001). She
argues that whilst causal mechanisms (deliberative plans) are one route to setting up a
new venture, the alternative is to use ‘effectuation’. To illustrate her argument, she
suggests that ‘cooks’ (entrepreneurs) often just go into their ‘cupboard’ to identify
their available ‘ingredients’ (resources and capabilities) and proceed from these
ingredients to imagine what a meal (new venture) will look like. This contrasts with
using a ‘recipe’ (business plan) to cook a meal.
Zahra, Sapienza and Davidsson (2006) have also argued that improvisation is key and
suggest “… that managers (both in new and established firms) do not, and probably
should not, create ‘once-and-for-all’ solutions or routines for their operations but
continually reconfigure or revise the capabilities they have developed” (p. 920-1).
Our results, however, starkly point to the value of business plans. The key result is
that ventures with written business plans grew faster than those without written plans
(by, on average, 33.4% points per annum), having controlled for selection effects.
This supports Hypothesis 1 and suggests that business plans help raise entrepreneurial
capabilities thereby enhancing performance.
Our interpretation of this finding is that it does not mean that ‘trial by error’ or
‘improvisational’ strategies are unimportant. As Bhide (2002) suggests entrepreneurs
are not often faced by a ‘plan’ versus ‘tacit learning’ choice. Bhide (2000), (like
Mintzberg and Waters 1985, Mintzberg 1991 and Mintzberg 1994), sees the value of
informal learning or a reliance on an emergent strategy as beneficial, particularly in
entrepreneurial contexts. However, what our evidence suggests is that writing a
business plan does not preclude learning: instead business plans offer a key referential
resource to assess and support the performance of the venture (Block and MacMillan,
1992).
The second impetus behind the paper was to investigate interaction effects. We
suggested that prior approaches failed to appropriately capture the nuances of these
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interaction effects. We now discuss these findings and reflect upon the implications
for our understanding of the role of deliberative and improvisational approaches.
Two of the profiles considered in Table 3 were serial and portfolio entrepreneurs.
The results show that there were, perhaps, initial benefits to not writing a plan for
these two types of entrepreneur in that they had intrinsically higher growth profiles
than their counterparts with written plans (selection effects -9% points (serial) and -
10% points (portfolios)). However, business plan impacts effects (27.8% points
(serials) and 42% points (portfolio)) outweigh these profile effects. In other words,
whilst serial and portfolio entrepreneurs that do not write a business plan may
experience an initial growth advantage (based on their higher growth profiles) those
with plans not only make up for deficiencies in their profile but even surpass the
employment growth of non-planners.
This has implications for our understanding of how entrepreneurs learn.
Entrepreneurial learning theorists such as Mezirow (1991) and Harvey and Evans
(1995) suggest that entrepreneurship is path dependent whilst Cope (2005) has argued
that aspiring entrepreneurs need to consider the stock of their accumulated
knowledge. Minniti and Bygrave (2001) also suggest that “knowledge is cumulative.
What is learned in one period builds upon what was learned in an earlier period”
(p.7). Finally, Carter et al (1996) have argued that improvisational learning is pivotal
to new venture creation.
Our interpretation, however, is that there are, indeed, initial advantages in having
prior experience to guide the growth of the venture. Nonetheless, the value of
‘emergent’ strategies (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) are soon outweighed by the value
of writing a plan. In other words, relying upon tacit knowledge may be useful but it is
no substitute for the direction provided by a written plan.
An important context we considered was where the venture was introducing new
product/services. This is important because new products/services may be seen as a
proxy for uncertainty. The argument here is that those introducing new
products/services are doing something novel. This requires them to learn and
introduce new routines into the venture. In such situations, ‘learning by doing’ may
be seen as being more conducive to growth because there is no ready guide to
introducing such products/services. Again, however, the results show that whilst
those without plans in this context may have an initial advantage (selection effect -
9.5% points), this was outweighed by the impact effect of business plans (35.1%
points). Our results are in line with Delmar and Shane (2003) who argued that written
business plans have benefits in terms of improving the managerial capabilities to learn
and introduce new routines.
Writing a business plan (impact effects) seems also to have positive impacts for those
with low human capital (the previously unemployed). Table 3 also points to similar
results for a ‘low’ enterprise area like Cleveland. Arguably, from a ‘learning by
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doing’ or emergent approach, there is little advantage in the previously unemployed
writing business plans because they will do little or nothing to raise their
entrepreneurial capabilities. Consistent with this, is a view that in low enterprise
areas, little can be done to enhance entrepreneurial capacities. Our results do not
support these theoretical promptings. Instead, writing a business plan appears to
guide individuals with low human capital, particularly in low enterprise areas, to grow
their venture.
Reinforcing such an interpretation is the role played by external support. Again, this
shows the same pattern: those that write business plans and use external support are
more likely to see their venture grow. This result supports the Chrisman and
McMullan (2000) who argue that external support is a key resource for the new
venture. It is also suggestive of an interpretation that sees business plans as a positive
isomorphic pressure on ventures. At the start of this paper, we identified that Honig
and Karlsson (2004) had queried the value of business plans. Their argument was
that, in order to conform and homogenize with particular institutional arrangements
(to ‘act as if’), new ventures were coerced into writing a business plan. One obvious
interpretation of this is that writing a business plan exerts a negative influence on the
performance of the new venture, perhaps because it ‘shoehorns’ the new venture into
a prescribed format. This may be suitable for enhancing the legitimation of the
venture, but may not be necessarily best for the venture itself.
Another context in which we identified that this may be particularly germane is in
terms of bank finance. Earlier on, we outlined the view that banks prefer low risk
ventures and, therefore, may use a business plan to screen ventures to distinguish high
and low risk borrowers. The suggestion here was that business plans perform an
important function of helping banks to select less risky ventures and that this will lead
to differences in performance.
Whilst we find that, amongst users of bank finance, those with written plans have
lower growth profiles (supporting a screening/selection argument) business plans
continue to have a positive impact in this context. Equally users of external support
also experience positive impacts from having written business plans. In other words,
whilst business plans appear to play a mimetic role, this discipline leads to our finding
of a positive rather than negative outcome. Indeed, our results suggest attempts by
support providers to enhance the quality of new ventures through business plans -
particularly for the previously unemployed and those in low enterprise areas – are
efficacious. The implication, therefore, is that this support should be enhanced by
policy makers if the aim is to see increased employment growth.
Overall, our results are uniform. They all point – regardless of the context – to
situations in which business plans improve the employment growth of the venture.
Because our results disentangle selection from impact effects, our interpretation is that
more deliberative approaches to new venture growth are more likely to be fruitful
than a reliance on learning by doing.
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5.1 Limitations and further research directions
This study provides an initial but important step in investigating the multi-channel
effect of business plans on venture performance. Further research could usefully
consider differing types of ventures (and at different stages of development), other
geographical locations and different external sources of finance. This may be
particularly important because we have limited measures of uncertainty. Our two
proxies – new products/services and sector dummies – may be judged to inadequately
capture the different forms of uncertainty and risk which can challenge a growing
venture. As Bhide (2000) argues the ability of business plans to reduce uncertainty
depends on what type of uncertainty a venture is facing. Further research using our
approach should, therefore, examine in greater granularity other measures of
innovation and more precise measures of sector than those available in our data;
especially as the methodology itself is designed to deal with differences in venture
profiles and contexts.
Similarly, the advantages of our approach can serve to open up again to renewed
scrutiny the ways in which inter alia, environmental munificence and dynamism
influence the importance of business plans (Fredrickson, and Mitchell, 1984;
Fredrickson and Iaquinto, 1989; Brews and Hunt, 1999). Obviously, this suggests
that the approach should be applied not just to new ventures but also to existing
ventures. This may provide qualitatively different results to ours in terms of the scale
and direction of the importance of business plans but, nevertheless signals a more
careful disentangling of the relationship between business plans and venture
performance.
Indeed, we call for further replication and verification of our findings using differing
individual performance outcome measures (e.g. sales, profitability) as well as more
multi-dimensional approaches to performance (Nicholls-Nixon et al. 2000). This may
also apply to survival, particularly given that all of our ventures are survivors, but we
note that Delmar and Shane (2003) have looked specifically at the relationship
between business plans and venture survival. They conclude, as we do, that business
plans have positive performance benefits.
There is also a greater need to continue to untangle the process of planning from that
of writing a business plan. This is important because, if the interest is in how
entrepreneurs learn, there is a need to further understand the stimulus, development
and use of written business plans. For example, there may be differences in the
quality of business plans. Unfortunately, we are unable to fully trace the relationships
between means (planning processes) and ends (business plans) (Sarasvathy, 2001).
Furthermore, our data does not consider cognitive biases. de Meza (2002), for
example, argues that what typifies entrepreneurs is their optimism (see also Fraser and
Greene, 2006). If business plans are efficacious, then what role do they have in
altering cognitive biases such as optimism? Fundamentally, what our approach and
evidence points to is the need for more qualitative research: research that not only
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acknowledges the multi-channel reasons for writing business plans but explores how -
both theoretically and empirically - this is connected to business planning, the
cognitive biases of the entrepreneur and the audience for such plans.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we address the claim that business plans have multiple effects on new
venture performance. We show that the theoretical literature indicates that business
plans can have an impact on new venture performance by helping ventures to enhance
their managerial ability and to secure resources for the venture. We also note that
different types of ventures are more likely to choose to write business plans and
therefore a selection effect can result where the profiles of ventures who write
business pans can systematically differ form those that do not. We also show the
theoretical literature also indicates that both impact and selection effects are likely to
differ depending on the type of profile of the venture and the context in which
business plans are written.
We highlight that existing empirical methodologies used to estimate the impact of
business plans on venture performance do not account for these multiple causation
paths. At worst, through the use of dummy variables denoting the use of business
plans or not, they succeed in only accounting for a semi-merger of the combined
effect. We show that such as procedure leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of
the total effect by in effect ignoring the selection effect and only partially accounting
for impact effects. Not surprisingly, we note that this attempt to generate a
tautological and fully general conclusion about whether business plans promote or
hinder venture performance has led to contradictory and inconclusive findings.
We offer an alternative econometric methodology which is capable of isolating
selection from impact effects as well as accounting for their variation across
observable differences in the profile of ventures and the business contexts in which
they write business plans. We apply this to UK data on de novo ventures and find
negative (-10% points) selection effects and stronger positive impact effects (+33%
points) for the overall sample. The significance and signs on these effects are
consistent with theory and the positive value on the impact effect indicates that for
this sample at least business plans promote growth. Again consistent with theory we
find that impact and selection effects differ across different types of venture profiles
and their business contexts. Notably, we find that business plans are particularly
helpful at increasing the growth performance of apparently lesser able entrepreneurs
i.e. those who were previously unemployed. We also find them to be particularly
useful in the entrepreneurial context where the venture is launching a new product of
service. Our results are of course limited to a sample of 3 regions in the UK but their
clarity and consistency with the deeper theoretical literature call for the need of
further empirical analysis in other regions and economies (or industry specific data) as
well as using more varied performance measures than our singular use of firm growth.
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The paper offers a methodology capable of facilitating this research. The aim for this
research trajectory is for the management literature to be able to inform different
types (profiles) of entrepreneurs how worthwhile writing a business plan will be in
promoting the performance of their particular venture and in what particular contexts
will writing a business plan be most beneficial.
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Figure 2: Interview pipeline
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
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Table 2: Log number of employees in 2001
Business
plans decision
(Selection)
(Log) Size in 2001
(with plan)
(Log) Size in 2001
(without plan)
Venture/entrepreneur
profile
Serial Entrepreneur -0.069
(0.214)
-0.029 (0.748) 0.222*
(0.086)
Portfolio Entrepreneur 0.141
(0.158)
-0.198
(0.102)
e-records 0.096**
(0.037)
Own accountant 0.087*
(0.073)
Male -0.033
(0.597)
0.042
(0.668)
0.099
(0.502)
Previously
Unemployed
0.111*
(0.061)
-0.082
(0.399)
-0.184
(0.236)
(Log) size at start-up 0.860***
(0.000)
0.630***
(0.000)
Manufacturing 0.001
(0.988)
-0.153 (0.279) -0.074 (0.723)
Construction 0.039
(0.697)
-0.070 (0.657) 0.092
(0.715)
Professional -0.134*
(0.082)
-0.111 (0.407) 0.061
(0.733)
Distribution -0.080
(0.290)
0.025
(0.840)
0.317*
(0.069)
Limited Company 0.404
(0.110)
-0.213
(0.496)
Sole trader -0.003
(0.991)
-0.578*
(0.054)
Partnership 0.207
(0.416)
-0.598**
(0.049)
Context
Used External support
at start-up
0.375***
(0.000)
0.058
(0.815)
-0.619***
(0.001)
Use of bank start-up
finance
0.363
(0.219)
-0.088 (0.904) 0.330
(0.785)
Bank finance used in
the last year
-0.155 (0.163) -0.067
(0.710)
Savings used in the
last year
-0.176
(0.055)
0.068
(0.536)
New Product/Services 0.136**
(0.048)
0.337***
(0.009)
-0.130
(0.406)
Cleveland 0.234*** 0.100 -0.302**
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(0.000) (0.400) (0.039)
Vintage dummies (p-
value)
0.126 0.012** 0.017**
Constant -0.289**
(0.025)
-0.209 (0.683) 0.466
(0.471)

1 =
0.209
(0.625)


0
0.955***
(0.000)
N=422 21 0.556
(0.000)

2
0 0.934
(0.000)
Log-likelihood=
-610.403
)(2 valuep  =0.000
Notes:
1. p-values in parentheses; ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively.
2. Bank finance used at start-up is instrumented with a dummy variable for bank finance used as the
main source of finance in the last year (2000-2001).
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Table 3: Decompositions of total plans effects into impact and selection effects
Impact Effect Selection Effect TPE
Average annual growth
between start-up and
2001
33.4% points
(0.000)
-10.0% points
(0.000)
23.4% points
(0.000)
Used bank start-up
finance
21.6% points
(0.000)
-9.7% points (0.000) 11.9 % points
(0.000)
New Products/Services 35.1% points
(0.000)
-9.5% points (0.000) 25.6% points
(0.000)
Previously unemployed 36.0% points
(0.000)
-9.7% points (0.000) 26.3% points
(0.000)
Male 33.0% points
(0.000)
-10.0% points
(0.000)
22.9% points
(0.000)
Serial Entrepreneur 27.8% points
(0.000)
-9.0% points (0.000) 18.8% points
(0.000)
Portfolio Entrepreneur 42.0% points
(0.000)
-10.0% points
(0.000)
32.0% points
(0.000)
Used external support at
start-up
34.1% points
(0.000)
-7.3% points (0.002) 26.8% points
(0.000)
Cleveland 39.1% points
(0.000)
-8.5% points (0.001) 30.6% points
(0.000)
Manufacturing 31.2% points
(0.000)
-10.0% points
(0.000)
21.2% points
(0.000)
Construction 28.6% points
(0.000)
-10.0% points
(0.000)
18.6% points
(0.000)
Professional 29.3% points
(0.000)
-10.0% points
(0.000)
19.4% points
(0.000)
Distribution 25.7% points
(0.000)
-9.0% points (0.000) 16.7% points
(0.000)
Notes: p-values in parenthesis.
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Appendix 1: Business plans model
The endogenous switching regression model for business plans has the following
analytical form:
   ,,0~,,
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where: *bp represents the firm’s latent utility from business plans (only those
businesses with a positive latent utility – i.e., those for whom the benefits of plans
exceed the costs – write business plans); *1y represents performance with a business
plan and *0y represents performance without a business plan, corresponding to the
upper and lower performance paths in Figure 1; and Z (resp. X ) is a row vector of
determinants of business plans (resp. performance). The residual terms  01 uu
capture the effects of unobserved variables e.g., entrepreneurial capability and
motivation, on plans decisions and performances. The residual variance-covariance
matrix is given by:











0011010
0110111
10111






The parameters  

 01 resp. measure the correlation between unobserved effects in
the equations for plans decisions and performance with (resp. without) a business
plan. These correlations capture the endogeneity of decisions to write/not write
business plans on subsequent performance. In the instance of exogenous switching
these correlations are zero (in which case plans decisions and performances could be
estimated by single equation methods). The variables in Z and X may overlap but
typically the selection equation will include variables, which do not appear in
performances, for purposes of identifying the performance equations.
The assumption of normality is made to facilitate estimation of the model by
maximum likelihood. For a continuous performance measure this likelihood is given
by:
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where  and  are the standard normal density and cumulative distribution functions
respectively.
Total plans effects (TPE), impact effects and selection effects
The total plans effect (TPE) (referred to in the treatment effects literature as the
average treatment effect) for firm i is given by   0011  iii XXXTPE  . The TPE
may be decomposed as:
      .
effectSelection
001
effectImpact
011 
 XXXXTPE i 
The first term on the right hand side represents the performance response to business
plans  01   for businesses with the observed profile of a planner  1X . This is the
‘impact effect’ which is the part of the TPE caused by business plans itself. The
second term on the right hand side is the ‘selection effect’ which is the portion of the
TPE caused solely by differences between the observed profiles of planners and non-
planners as given by  01 XX  . In this case the performance coefficients (which
measure the response of performance to changes in the explanatory variables) are held
at their non-plans levels ( 0 ).
Effects of plans on growth
The total plans, impact and selection effects on growth may be calculated directly
from the estimates of the log size in 2001 (conditional on log start-up size) model. To
see this, firstly write the equations for log size as follows
0
*
0
*
0,002001,0
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1
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1,112001,1
lnln
lnln
uXyy
uXyy
s
s

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
where:  2001,02001,1 lnln yy is the natural log of size in 2001 amongst planners (resp.
non-planners);  ss yy ,0,1 lnln is the natural log of size in the start-up year
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 st  amongst planners (resp. non-planners); and  *0*1 XX is a row vector of the
other explanatory variables in the performance equation for planners (resp. non-
planners). Simply re-writing these equations, to make changes in log size between
start-up and 2001 the dependent variable (which approximates relative changes in size
over these periods), gives
 
  0
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0,002001,0
1
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1
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1,112001,1
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uXyy
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where   .1,0,lnlnln ,,2001,,2001,2001,  jyyyyyy sjsjjsjjj The total
plans, impact and selection effects, on relative changes in size, can then be calculated,
using the decomposition of the TPE reported in the previous section, with
  1,0,
1
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*
, 

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
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Note that only estimates of the parameters from the log size in 2001 (conditional on
log start-up size) model are required for the growth effects calculations. The effects
of plans on growth rates are simply the effects on relative size changes 100 (the
growth rates are measured on a percentage scale so the effects on growth are
measured in percentage points). Finally, dividing the (firm level) growth effects, by
the business age (in 2001) in years, yields estimates of the average annual effects.
Relationship between the switching regression model and dummy variable estimates
of the TPE
The relationship between the switching regression and dummy variable estimates of
the TPE may be seen by expanding the TPE as follows
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where we have partitioned the  k1 vector 1X  0resp. X into the constant term (1)
and a  11  k vector of variable characteristics 1x  0resp. x ; and we have
conformably partitioned 1  0resp. into the (scalar) intercept coefficient
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0
1  
0
0resp. and a   11 k vector of coefficients 1
~
  0
~resp. for the variable
characteristics.
The dummy variable approach estimates the impact of plans by a differential intercept
between those with and without plans. In the above formulation this is measured by
the first term: 00
0
1   . In general therefore it can be seen that the dummy variable
approach is a biased and inconsistent estimator of the TPE because it provides an
incomplete description of the TPE. Indeed, the switching regression and dummy
variable estimates of the TPE only coincide where the response to plans (impact
effect) does not depend on the characteristics of the planner and the contexts for plans
(i.e.,   0~~ 011  x ) and where there is no selection effect (i.e.,   0
~
001  xx ).
So, in summary, the dummy variable approach is an unsuitable framework for
analyzing the multiple effects of business plans because it totally ignores selection
effects and provides only a partial description of the impact effect.
